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This study aimed at assessing whether the mere belief of performing a task with another
person, who is in charge of the complementary part of the task, is sufficient for the
so-called joint Simon effect to occur. In all three experiments of the study, participants sat
alone in a room and underwent two consecutive Go/NoGo tasks that were identical except
for the instructions. In Experiment 1, participants performed the task first individually
(baseline task), and then either co-acting with another person who responded from an
unknown location to the NoGo stimuli (joint task) or imaging themselves responding to the
NoGo stimuli (imaginative task). Relative to the baseline, the instructions of the imaginative
task made the Simon effect occur, while those of the joint task were ineffective in eliciting
the effect. This result suggests that sharing a task with a person who is known to be in
charge of the complementary task, but is not physically present, is not sufficient to induce
the representation of an alternative response able to produce interference, which happens
instead when the instructions explicitly require to imagine such a response. Interestingly,
we observed that when the Simon effect was already present in the baseline task (i.e.,
when the response alternative to the Go response was represented in the individual
task due to non-social factors), it disappeared in the joint task. We propose that, when
no information about the co-actor’s position is available, the division of labor between
the participant and co-actor allows participants to filter out the possible (incidental)
representation of the alternative response from their task representation, thus eliminating
potential sources of interference. This account is supported by the results of Experiments
2 and 3 and suggests that under certain circumstances task-sharing may reduce the
interference produced by the irrelevant information, rather than increase it.
Keywords: spatial compatibility, joint Simon effect, joint action, social interaction, social cognition, division of
labor, referential coding, action co-representation
INTRODUCTION
In the last years, a growing number of studies used the joint ver-
sion of the Simon task to investigate whether and to what extent
co-action (i.e., the execution of a task with another person) affects
individual performance.
In a typical Simon task, the imperative stimulus (e.g., a red
or green square) is presented on the left or right of the screen
and participants have to press a left or right button depending
on a non-spatial stimulus attribute (e.g., its color). Participants
are usually faster and more accurate when the position of the
stimulus corresponds to the position of the required response
(corresponding trials) than when it does not correspond (non-
corresponding trials). This effect (the so-called Simon effect;
Simon and Small, 1969) is attributed to processes occurring at
the response selection stage (e.g., Rubichi and Pellicano, 2004;
Treccani et al., 2009). Basically, most accounts of the Simon effect
assume that, even if irrelevant to the task, the stimulus position
is automatically coded. The dimensional overlap between this
task-irrelevant stimulus dimension and the response dimension
(i.e., both dimension are spatial and refer to left and right)
represents the prerequisite for either facilitation or interference
processes to occur when the response is selected (see Kornblum
and Lee, 1995). The irrelevant, automatically generated, spatial
code of the stimulus is thought to interact with the spatial code
of the response that is being activated on the basis of the task-
relevant stimulus attribute. Response selection is facilitated when
the stimulus and response codes are congruent: the selection of
the required response benefits from the activation of a congruent
spatial stimulus code. In contrast, response selection is interfered
by an incongruent spatial code: when the two codes are incon-
gruent, a conflict takes place that delays reaction times (RTs) or
causes the selection of the incorrect response (see Wiegand and
Wascher, 2005, and Proctor and Vu, 2006, for an overview of the
main hypotheses advanced to account for the Simon effect).
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The Simon effect is thought to be an index of the representa-
tion of two responses that are spatially alternative to one another.
No spatial response coding, and thus no Simon effect, occurs
when only one response, even though spatially denoted (e.g., the
press of a button placed on the left-side of the participant), is
involved, for example, in Go/NoGo tasks (Callan et al., 1974;
Ansorge andWühr, 2004, 2009). In two-choice tasks, indeed, spa-
tial response coding has been shown to be based on response
relative position: each response is coded with reference to the
position of the alternative one (Umiltà and Nicoletti, 1985).
In the joint variant of the Simon task, two individuals, sitting
next to one another, share the task in such a way that each person
responds to only one of the two possible values of the stimu-
lus by pressing a button in front of his/her body, that is, they
perform two complementary Go/NoGo tasks (e.g., one partici-
pant responds to the red square only and the other participant
responds to the green square only). Interestingly, a Simon effect
is observed in these complementary Go/NoGo tasks: responses
are faster when the position of the stimulus corresponds to the
position of the responding participant with reference to the posi-
tion of the co-actor (Sebanz et al., 2003; Tsai et al., 2006; see also
Milanese et al., 2010, for an extension of the classical paradigm).
To account for the joint Simon effect, Sebanz et al. (2006) pro-
posed the so-called action co-representation account. According to
this account, in joint tasks participants tend to represent the co-
actor’s task (i.e., his/her aims and intentions: the response the
co-actor is required to emit and the stimuli to which s/he has to
respond), and integrate this representation in their action plan-
ning. As a consequence, participants’ performance is impaired as
if they were in charge of the co-actor’s task as well. The spatial
coding of two distinct responses leads to an interference effect (see
Ferraro et al., 2011) when the participant’s response is required
but the position of the stimulus primes the co-actor’s response.
In this case, the spatial code of the stimulus does not correspond
to the spatial code of the required response and this lengthens RTs
similarly to what happens in standard (two-choice) Simon tasks.
Even though a number of studies have collected evidence
in support of the action co-representation account of the joint
Simon effect, this interpretation has been recently challenged by
the results of other studies showing that the joint Simon effect
might be mainly a spatial phenomenon rather than a social one
(Guagnano et al., 2010; Dolk et al., 2011, 2013a; Dittrich et al.,
2012, 2013).
For example, Guagnano et al. (2010) observed that two partic-
ipants performing concurrently two independent detection tasks
showed a Simon effect when they acted side-by-side, but not when
they were far from each other. Guagnano et al. proposed that the
joint Simon effect occurs because participants spatially code their
own response using the position of the co-actor as a reference
point. This reference point can only be used if the other person is
located within the participant’s peripersonal space. According to
the authors, the representation of the co-actor’s intentions would
not have a functional role in the emergence of the Simon effect:
the fact that another person is performing the task in close prox-
imity simply leads the participant to code spatially his/her own
response, which, in turn, provides the necessary conditions for
the Simon effect to occur.
In the same vein, a recent study of Dolk et al. (2011) pro-
vided evidence against the action co-representation account. To
test whether the joint Simon effect really reflects the integration of
the co-actor’s action into one’s own action planning, the authors
combined the joint Simon task with the so-called Rubber Hand
Illusion (RHI; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). The RHI is a well-
known experimental manipulation that allows one to experience
the illusion of ownership of a rubber hand when it is stroked syn-
chronously with one’s own hidden hand. On the contrary, the
asynchronous stroking condition prevents the rubber hand to be
included in one’s own body schema. In contrast with what would
have been expected on the basis of the action co-representation
account (i.e., a larger joint Simon effect in the synchronous
integrative condition than in the asynchronous non-integrative
condition), the results showed the opposite pattern: the Simon
effect was larger when participants perceived the co-actor’s hand
as separated from themselves (i.e., in the asynchronous stroking
condition).
According to Dolk et al., the larger Simon effect observed in
the asynchronous stroking condition is probably due to the fact
that this manipulation emphasized the existence of an alternative
action. On the basis of these results, Dolk et al. (2011) proposed
the so-called referential coding account of the joint Simon effect
(cf., Hommel, 1993). Following this account, the joint Simon
effect it not really a social phenomenon but it occurs because
the co-actor constitutes a salient event that provides participants
with an alternative action, thus allowing them to code spatially
their own response. Importantly, in a follow up study, Dolk
et al. (2013a) demonstrated that any salient event able to attract
attention (i.e., not necessarily a response emitted by another per-
son but even, e.g., the movement of a ticking metronome) can
represent an action alternative to that of the participant (i.e.,
an action from which the participant’s response has to be dis-
criminated). Consequently, the spatial coding of the participant’s
response position can occur with reference to any salient event.
Interestingly, Vlainic et al. (2010) showed that such a spatial ref-
erential coding, once established, does not need online perceptual
feed-back to be maintained: the joint Simon effect showed by two
participants acting side-by-side continued to occur even when
they are blindfolded. Further studies showed that spatial response
coding can be based on different reference frames (see Dittrich
et al., 2013). For instance, it may rely on the participant’s position
with reference to the co-actor’s position (e.g., the participant’s
response may be coded as “left” if the co-actor is on the right
side of the participant). Alternatively, spatial response coding can
be based on the relative positions of the participant’s and co-
actor’s response devices (e.g., regardless of the co-actor’s position,
the participant’s response may be coded as “left” if the partici-
pant’s response button is on the left with respect to the co-actor’s
response button), and participants may switch between the two
reference frames (Dolk et al., 2013b; Liepelt et al., 2013; see also
Milanese et al., 2011).
It is worth noting that both the action co-representation and
the referential coding accounts share the assumption that in joint
tasks the involvement of another person leads participants to rep-
resent an alternative action. Consistently, Sebanz et al. (2003)
(Experiment 2) observed that no Simon effect occurs when the
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co-actor merely sat next to the participant, without emitting
any response. In this case, indeed, there is no alternative action.
The two accounts, however, differ from each other with respect
to the nature of the joint Simon effect: social (for the action
co-representation account) or spatial (for the referential coding
account). Indeed, following the action co-representation account,
the representation of the alternative action occurs because the
participant represents the co-actor’s task, which happens to be
his/her complementary task (see Sebanz et al., 2005): the co-
actor is responding to the alternative value of the stimulus with
a spatially alternative response. A logical implication is that the
mere knowledge about the co-actor’s task, besides being neces-
sary, should also be sufficient to give rise to the Simon effect.
In contrast, the referential coding account states that an alter-
native action is represented simply by virtue of the fact that
the co-actor’s response constitutes a salient event, which cannot
be ignored by the participant and from which the participant’s
action has to be discriminated, occurring on the side opposite to
the participant’s response position (Dolk et al., 2011, 2013a,b).
As a consequence, the knowledge about the co-actor’s task
should be neither necessary nor sufficient for the Simon effect
to occur.
Based on these premises, the problem of disentangling these
two accounts can be turn into the problem of verifying whether
the mere knowledge about the co-actor’s task is sufficient to
make participants represent an alternative response that produces
interference, thus yielding the Simon effect.
A possible way to shed light on this question is to make the
actor and co-actor execute their own part of the task in differ-
ent rooms. If the belief of co-acting with another person who is
responding to the complementary color is sufficient to code spa-
tially the response associated with this color, the joint Simon effect
should occur even when the co-actor performs his/her part of the
task in a different, not-specified room. Conversely, if what allows
participants to represent the alternative action is the fact that the
co-actor represents a salient spatially-connoted event occurring
next to the participant, no Simon effect should be observed when
the co-actor is not physically present and executes his/her part of
the task in a different room.
The present study aimed at evaluating the role of task-sharing
in the occurrence of the joint Simon effect by eliminating the
possible contribution of the physical presence of the co-actor.
Studies that have previously tried to isolate the impacts of these
two factors showed contrasting, and thus not conclusive results.
Furthermore, both studies that have found the mere awareness of
sharing a task with another to be sufficient to produce the joint
Simon effect (Tsai et al., 2008 and Ruys and Aarts, 2010) and
the study that has not (Welsh et al., 2007) involved possible con-
founding factors that might account for their results. The present
study was designed in order to control for these factors and solve
such inconsistencies.
The first study that explicitly addressed this issue is the work
by Welsh et al. (2007). These authors failed to observe the joint
Simon effect when the co-actor was thought to perform the com-
plementary task in a different room. However, Welsh et al. used a
within-participants design in which participants performed four
tasks in a fixed order (i.e., the two-choice task, the individual
Go/NoGo task, the co-actor present joint task and the co-actor
absent joint task). Therefore, one cannot rule out that the lack
of a significant Simon effect in the forth critical task (i.e., the
joint task in which the co-actor was absent) is due to practice
effects. Indeed, even though the Simon effect has been proved to
be robust, it can be significantly reduced through practice (e.g.,
Simon et al., 1973).
In contrast with Welsh et al. (2007), two recent studies showed
that the Simon effect can be observed in joint tasks even when
the actor and the co-actor performed their parts of the task in
two different rooms (Tsai et al., 2008; Ruys and Aarts, 2010), thus
suggesting that the mere belief of co-acting with another person
can be sufficient to induce the joint Simon effect. However, some
methodological concerns of these two studies do not allow ascrib-
ing unequivocally the occurrence of the Simon effect to the social
manipulation.
In Tsai et al.’s (2008) study, participants sat alone in a room and
were instructed to press the right button of a computer mouse
when a lateralized green square appeared on the screen and to
refrain from responding when a red square was presented. They
were told that they would have performed the task with another
individual, who was in another room and responded to the com-
plementary color (the red square) by pressing the left button. A
Simon effect was observed: responses were faster when the target
position corresponded to the participant’s response button (i.e.,
the target was on the right) than when it did not correspond (i.e.,
the target was on the left).
In line with the action co-representation account, the Simon
effect observed by Tsai et al. (2008) could be explained by assum-
ing that the belief of co-acting with another individual, responsi-
ble for the complementary color, let participants to activate, not
only the representation of the action they had to execute, but also
the representation of the co-actor’s action. Yet, this effect could
be traced back to spatial (non-social) factors rather than to the
knowledge about the co-actor’s task. That is, the representation
of both left and right responses might have been prompted by the
use of the mouse as response devise.
It is well-known that, although the Simon effect does not usu-
ally occur in individual Go/NoGo tasks (Callan et al., 1974),
there are several exceptions to this rule: the Simon effect may
be observed in this kind of tasks when the experimental condi-
tions lead participants, not only to activate the required response,
but also to code another (non-operative) response. This occurs,
for example, when a Go/NoGo task is preceded by a two-
choice task in which participants used two response buttons
(Ansorge and Wühr, 2004, 2009; see also Lugli et al., 2013).
As previously discussed, the occurrence of the Simon effect is
reckoned to be an index of the representation of two spatially
alternative actions. Accordingly, in these Go/NoGo tasks, partic-
ipants are thought to represent both the Go response and the
alternative not-required response. That, in turn, is attributed
to their previous experience with the two-choice task, which
required the actual execution of the alternative response: the
representation of the alternative response, activated in the two-
choice task, is transferred to the subsequent (Go/NoGo) task,
even though in the second task this response is no longer task
relevant.
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In Tsai et al.’s (2008) study the participant did not perform a
two-choice task before the critical joint task. However, prior expe-
rience might have been crucial for the occurrence of the Simon
effect in their paradigm as well. The response device used in
Tsai et al. involves two possible responses: the standard computer
mouse presents two response buttons and is made in such a way
that, in order to operate it effectively, both the index and mid-
dle fingers have to be placed on the corresponding buttons even
when only one button has to be pressed. These two responses
are not comparable in terms of frequency of use: the left but-
ton (i.e., the primary mouse button in standard multi-button
mice) is more frequently used than the right one. All partici-
pants of Tsai et al.’s study responded to the Go stimuli by pressing
the (secondary) right mouse button. Similarly to what happens
when the Go/NoGo task is preceded by a task that involves the
alternative response, the practice in daily life with the left mouse
button might have led participants of Tsai et al.’s study to acti-
vate the representation of the left button in addition to that of
the right one (i.e., when using the secondary mouse button, par-
ticipants could not help coding the primary one as well). The
resulting spatial response coding might have been the cause of the
observed Simon effect. Obviously, a similar Simon effect is not
at all social in nature: it would have occurred even if participants
had been told that they were performing the task by themselves.
Tsai et al.’s did not control for the possible role of such factors
in the occurrence of the Simon effect and did not provide for a
control condition in which participants believed that they were
on their own while performing the Go/NoGo task. Accordingly,
the occurrence of the Simon effect in their joint task cannot be
unequivocally ascribed to the belief of co-acting with another
person and to the representation of the response emitted by this
person. It is also worth noting that the position of the co-actor’s
response was not the only spatial cue with which participants were
provided in Tsai et al.’s study. They also knew the position of the
room in which the co-actor was acting: the co-actor was thought
to perform the task in an adjacent room that had been shown to
the participant before the experimental phase. This might have
had a role in inducing the spatial effect observed in Tsai et al.’s
joint task.
Unwanted spatial factors involved by the experimental pro-
cedure can also account for the joint Simon effect observed by
Ruys and Aarts (2010). In this study, participants performed an
auditory version of the joint Simon task: they were instructed
to respond to a certain tone by pressing a right-side key (“3”
on the numerical keyboard) and to withhold the response to
another tone because another person, who was in another
room, responded to it by pressing a left-side key (“z”). The joint
Simon effect was observed although the co-actor was acting in
a different room: participants were faster when the Go tone was
presented at the right ear than when it was presented at the left
ear. However, the occurrence of the Simon effect can be justified
by a minor detail of the experimental procedure: in order to
remind participants that another person was engaged in the task,
the co-actor’s responses were signaled with a red light occurring
on the left side of the screen, whereas participants’ responses were
signaled with a red light occurring on the right side. Thus, even
if the co-actor was not physically present, the lateralized light,
spatially corresponding to the response button of the co-actor,
represents a salient, visible event, which stands for an action
alternative to that of the participant. The fact that the responses
of both the participant and the co-actor were followed by the
presentation of lateralized lights, spatially corresponding to their
respective response buttons, might have induced participants
to code their own response as “right” as opposed to the left
light signaling the co-actor’s response. Furthermore, given that
the participant and the co-actor were recruited in couples and
placed in adjacent rooms, very likely they both knew their relative
positions, as in Tsai et al.’s (2008) study.
Thus, whether the mere knowledge about the co-actor’s task
is sufficient to give rise to the Simon effect remains to be ascer-
tained. In order to address this issue and to control for the possible
role of other (non-social) factors in the occurrence of the Simon
effect in prior studies (e.g., Tsai et al., 2008), we decided to
employ a paradigm that, despite being similar to that of Tsai et al.,
allowed us to test the effects of both task-sharing and the device
used to respond (a computer mouse) on the representation of an
action alternative to the participant’s response. These effects were
intended to be compared with those observed when the represen-
tation of such an alternative action was explicitly requested by the
task instructions.
In all the experiments of the present study, participants sat
alone in a room and were required to respond to the target stimuli
by pressing one of the two buttons of the mouse. Although only
one response was requested, the response device involved a possi-
ble alternative response (i.e. the press of the non-requested mouse
button). In Experiment 1, we manipulated the task instructions
to compare two critical experimental conditions. In one of them,
participants were explicitly required to activate the representa-
tion of the alternative response: they had to imagine that they
were responding to the alternative stimulus with the alternative
response1. In the other condition, participants were simply told
that another person was responding (from an unknown location)
to the alternative stimulus.
Contrary to Tsai et al. (2008), we counterbalanced across par-
ticipants the mouse button used to respond. As mentioned above,
the two mouse buttons are not comparable in terms of frequency
of use, and this might cause different spatial effects for partici-
pants who used the left and right mouse buttons. Such findings
would have extended the implications of studies on between-task
transfer of spatial response representations (Ansorge and Wühr,
2004, 2009; Lugli et al., 2013). Therefore, this study could not
only help to clarify the inconsistencies between the results of
prior studies on the joint Simon effect (e.g., Welsh et al., 2007;
Tsai et al., 2008), but also provide cues for the comprehension
of the impact of previous experience in standard (individual)
Simon tasks.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 aimed at testing the predictions of the two
main accounts of the joint Simon effect (i.e., the action co-
representation account, Sebanz et al., 2006, and the referential
1As recently shown, participants can easily imagine themselves performing
a response they do not actually execute provided that the response device is
present and they have the possibility to operate it (i.e., they are not prevented
from reaching it; Iani et al., 2013).
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coding account, Dolk et al., 2013a) in some critical conditions
meant to isolate the factors that these accounts indicate as cru-
cial for the occurrence of the effect. First of all, participants
performed an individual Go/NoGo task (i.e., the baseline task),
which required them to press one of the two buttons of the mouse
when the target stimulus was of one of two alternative colors.
Afterwards, they executed a second task (i.e., either an imagina-
tive two-choice task or a joint task) which was identical to the
baseline task except for the instructions. In the imaginative two-
choice task, besides responding to the Go color, participants were
also asked to imagine themselves responding to the NoGo color
by pressing the alternative mouse button. In the joint task, partic-
ipants continued to respond to the Go color but they also believed
that they were performing the task with a co-actor, who was
in a non-specified room and was responding to complementary
(NoGo) color. Actually, participants performed the task on their
own. Finally, to control for possible practice effects, a third group
of participants was required to continue to perform the Go/NoGo
task individually.
Given that transfer effects from one task to another are very
common in this kind of tasks (Ansorge and Wühr, 2004; Lugli
et al., 2013; Ansorge and Wühr, 2009), we preferred not to coun-
terbalance the order of the two tasks. Therefore, all participants
started with the individual Go/NoGo task, enabling us to consider
this individual task as a proper baseline.
The following predictions could be made. First of all, as men-
tioned above, we expected to observe a Simon effect in the
baseline task, but only for participants who responded to the
Go stimuli by pressing the right mouse button (i.e., the less fre-
quently used mouse button). No Simon effect should emerge for
participants using the left mouse button.
In the imaginative two-choice task, which explicitly required
participants to activate the representation of the NoGo response,
a Simon effect was expected, regardless of the mouse button used
to respond.
In the joint task, different results were expected on the basis
of the two main hypotheses advanced to explain the joint Simon
effect. The action co-representation account states that the belief
of co-acting with another person responsible for the complemen-
tary color is sufficient to induce participants to represent the
co-actor’s response and to integrate it in their action planning
(Sebanz et al., 2005, 2006; Tsai et al., 2008). Accordingly, both left-
and right-button participants should show the joint Simon effect,
at least when they knew that the co-actor responded with the
alternative response button. Thus, these participants should show
the same pattern of results as that shown by participants who
performed the imaginative two-choice task. Conversely, accord-
ing to the referential coding account, the joint Simon effect
only depends on the co-actor constituting a salient, spatially-
connoted action event that occurs next to the participant (i.e.,
an attention-attracting, dynamic event, which cannot be ignored
and from which the participant’s response has to be spatially
discriminated; Guagnano et al., 2010; Dolk et al., 2011, 2013a).
Only such an event may represent a reference point for the spa-
tial coding of the participants’ response. Following this account,
no spatial response coding, and thus no Simon effect, could be
induced by the co-actor in the joint task used here: in this task,
the co-actor was not physically present and neither were there
other perceivable stimuli in the experimental setting that attracted
attention and could stand for the co-actor’s action (cf., Ruys and
Aarts, 2010). Therefore, the Simon effect might be present in
the joint task only for those participants who had already (and
irrespective of the belief of co-acting with another individual)
activated the alternative response and coded the position of the
requested response, that is, right-button participants.
METHODS
Participants and experimental design
Sixty-four undergraduate students of the University of Trento (9
males; aged 19–31 years; all right-handed) participated in the
experiment. All participants were naïve about the purpose of the
experiment and had normal or correct-to-normal vision.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experi-
mental conditions: the control, imaginative, or social condition.
Sixteen participants were assigned to either the control or the
imaginative condition, whereas 32 participants were assigned to
the social condition. Each condition comprised two tasks: the
baseline task and one of three critical tasks. Conditions were
defined as control, imaginative, or social depending on the task
that participants performed after the baseline: the repetition of
the individual Go/NoGo task, the imaginative two-choice task
and the joint task, respectively (see Figure 1).
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
All participants seated about 57 cm from a 17-inch monitor
screen and performed two tasks, with a 5-min break in between.
In all tasks, participants were instructed to press one of the two
buttons of a computer mouse in response to stimuli of one color
(Go color) and not to respond to stimuli of the other color (NoGo
color). The mouse was aligned with the middle of the screen.
Half of the participants responded with the left button, which was
operated with the index finger of the right hand; the other half
responded with the right button, which was operated with the
middle finger of the right hand. The Go color and the response
position were counterbalanced across participants and were kept
constant during the experiment (i.e., they were the same in the
two consecutive tasks). In the imaginative two-choice task, partic-
ipants were also asked to imagine responding to the NoGo color,
whereas in the joint task they believed that another person was
responding to the NoGo color. In the latter task, half of the par-
ticipants were told that the co-actor was responding with the same
button as them, whereas the other half were told that the co-actor
was using the alternative button.
In all tasks, trials began with presentation of a central 0.8◦ ×
0.8◦ white fixation cross, which remained visible for 500ms. At
the offset of fixation, the target stimulus (i.e., a 1.9◦ × 1.9◦ col-
ored square) was presented for 300ms. The target was shown
either on the left or on the right of the fixation cross (the cen-
ter of the target was horizontally aligned with the fixation cross,
5.7◦ to the left or right) and it could be either green or red. Both
the fixation cross and target were presented on a black back-
ground. Offset of the target was followed by a 500-ms blank
interval. Thus, on the whole the time allowed for the response
was 800ms. Missed responses, responses with latencies in excess
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the experimental design
adopted in Experiment 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three experimental conditions: control, imaginative or social. Each
experimental condition comprised two tasks (i.e., the baseline individual task
and the critical task). Participants assigned to the control condition, after
completed the baseline, simply continued to perform the same Go/NoGo
task individually. Participants assigned to the imaginative condition, once
completed the baseline, performed a task requiring them to imagine
responding to the complementary color. In contrast, participants assigned to
the social condition, after the baseline, were required to perform the same
Go/NoGo task with an alleged co-actor who was in a non-specified room and
was thought to respond to the complementary color.
of 800ms, responses to stimuli of the NoGo color and responses
with the wrong button were all counted as errors. If the response
was correct, the trial terminated with an additional 400-ms blank
interval. In the case of an error, a 200-ms visual error feedback (a
string of six exclamation marks) was presented instead, followed
by a 200ms blank interval.
In the joint task, a click sound, randomly ranging from 240–
622ms, was delivered during the NoGo trials. It was emanated
from two loudspeakers that were contiguous to the two sides
of the monitor screen (one on the left and one on the right).
This sound signaled the co-actor’s response and was meant to
increase the participant’s belief that another person was engaged
in the task. At the beginning of each block of joint-task trials,
participants were instructed to press their response mouse but-
ton to inform the alleged co-actor that they were ready to start.
Afterwards, a click sound and the presentation of an “ok” mes-
sage on the screen signaled to the participant that the co-actor
was ready to start as well. The computer delivered the co-actor’s
reply after a random time interval.
Each task consisted of 240 randomly mixed trials divided into
two blocks. There were 120 Go trials and 120 NoGo trials. In half
of the Go trials, stimulus and response positions corresponded,
whereas, in the other half, stimulus and response positions did
not correspond. Experimental trials were preceded by 8 practice
trials.
RESULTS
Error data (0.8%) were not analyzed. We first analyzed RTs
of the baseline task. Correct mean RTs were submitted to an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with spatial correspondence (cor-
responding vs. non-corresponding) as within-subjects factor and
two between-subjects factors: response button position (left- vs.
right-button participants) and condition (imaginative, social, and
control).
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of correspon-
dence [F(1, 58) = 21.97, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.28]. Participants were
faster in corresponding than in non-corresponding trials (332 vs.
340ms). Response position was also significant [F(1, 58) = 4.13,
p < 0.05; η2p = 0.07]: left-button participants were faster than
right-button participants (325 vs. 346ms). More important, a
significant Response position × Correspondence interaction was
found [F(1, 58) = 10.94, p < 0.01; η2p = 0.16]. Post-hoc analysis
(Newman–Keuls) revealed that responses of right-button partici-
pants were faster in corresponding than non-corresponding trials
(340 vs. 353ms, p < 0.001), whereas the two types of trials did
not differ from each other for left-button participants (324 vs.
326ms, p = 0.56). Condition did not yield a significant main
effect and did not interact with any other factors.
Next, we compared the baseline and the critical tasks of each
condition (see Figure 2).
Given the differences between left- and right-button partic-
ipants observed in the baseline task, separate ANOVAs were
conducted for the two response button positions. In each
ANOVA, there were two within-subjects factors: task (base-
line vs. critical task) and correspondence (corresponding vs.
non-corresponding). In the social condition, besides the two
within-subjects factors, the co-actor’s response button (same-
vs. alternative-button) was included in the analysis as between-
subjects factor.
The main effect of task was significant in both imaginative and
social conditions and for both left- and right-button participants
(all Fs ≥ 7.24; all ps < 0.05, all η2ps ≥ 0.34), whereas it was not
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FIGURE 2 | Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for each experimental
condition in Experiment 1. For each condition, RTs are plotted as a function
of response button position (left- vs. right-button participants), task (baseline
vs. second task) and spatial correspondence (corresponding vs.
non-corresponding trials). Asterisks indicate the presence of the Simon
effect.
significant for either group of participants in the control condi-
tion. In the imaginative condition, participants were slower in the
imaginative two-choice than in the baseline task (388 vs. 318ms
and 396 vs. 329ms, for left and right-button participants, respec-
tively). In the social condition, participants were faster in the joint
than in the baseline task (314 vs. 333ms and 325 vs. 348ms, for
left and right-button participants, respectively).
For right-button participants, a significant main effect of
correspondence was observed in all experimental conditions (all
Fs ≥ 6.28, all ps < 0.05, all η2ps ≥ 0.31). In contrast, for left-
button participants, correspondence had a significant main effect
only in the imaginative condition [F(1, 7) = 12.62, p < 0.01;
η2p = 0.64].
In the imaginative condition, the Task × Correspondence
interaction was significant only for left-button participants
[F(1, 7) = 14.84, p < 0.01; η2p = 0.68]. These participants showed
no Simon effect in the baseline task (p = 0.59), whereas they
showed a 32-ms Simon effect in the imaginative two-choice task
(p < 0.001). In contrast, for right-button participants, the inter-
action was not significant: the Simon effect was present in both
tasks (19- and 23-ms in the baseline and in the imaginative
two-choice tasks, respectively).
In the social condition, we found the opposite pattern of
results. The Task × Correspondence interaction was significant
only for right-button participants [F(1, 14) = 4.61, p < 0.05;
η2p = 0.25]. For these participants, corresponding trials yielded
faster responses than non-corresponding trials in the baseline
task (343 vs. 353ms; p < 0.001), whereas there was no difference
between corresponding and non-corresponding trials in the
joint task (324 vs. 325ms; p = 0.88). Conversely, for left-button
responding participants, this interaction was not significant.
The Simon effect was, indeed, absent in both the baseline and
joint tasks. Importantly, the three-way interaction was significant
for neither group of participants, which indicates that the same
pattern of results was obtained regardless of the co-actor’s button.
Indeed, the co-actor’s button did not have a significant main
effect either, and none of the interactions involving this factor
was significant. The Simon effect shown by right-button partic-
ipants in the baseline task disappeared in the joint task, whereas
left-button participants continued to shown no correspondence
effects, irrespective of whether the co-actor was thought to use
the same button as the participant or the alternative button: the
non-corresponding–corresponding differences in the same- vs.
alternative-button conditions of the joint tasks were 1 vs. 0ms
for right-button participants and 1 vs. −3ms for left-button
participants.
In the control condition, the Task × Correspondence interac-
tion was significant for neither right- nor left-button participants.
Right-button participants showed an 11-ms Simon effect both in
the baseline task and in the repetition of the individual Go/NoGo
task, whereas left-button participants showed no effect in either
task.
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DISCUSSION
The results obtained in the baseline task showed no Simon effect
for left-button participants: consistent with the results of previ-
ous studies (e.g., Ansorge and Wühr, 2004), the Simon effect did
not occur in an individual Go/NoGo task in which participants
only represented the Go response. The performance of these par-
ticipants thus represented a pure baseline to test whether the mere
belief of co-acting with another person who responds to the com-
plementary color is sufficient to give rise to the Simon effect. In
contrast, right-button participants showed a significant Simon
effect. This finding confirms our predictions and suggests that
right-button participants also represented the alternative (left)
button, although it was task irrelevant and it was not mentioned
in the instructions. Despite performing a Go/NoGo task, these
participants spatially code two alternative responses, which pro-
vides the necessary conditions for the Simon effect to occur (i.e.,
a stimulus-response spatial dimensional overlap; Kornblum and
Lee, 1995). In accordance with this account, right-button partici-
pants were found to be slower than left-button participants, who
presumably represented only the required response, thus prevent-
ing possible competitions between responses from slowing down
RTs (i.e., right-button RTs may involve an additional processing
stage—response selection—which is actually not required by a
Go/NoGo task; cf., Donders, 1868/1969). These results are con-
sistent with previous findings demonstrating the role of both
contextual factors and previous experience (here, the massive
practice with the left mouse button in daily life) in determin-
ing the representation of two alternative responses in individual
Go/NoGo tasks (Ansorge and Wühr, 2004, 2009; Lugli et al.,
2013). In the first place, therefore, the present findings make a
considerable contribution to the literature concerning the occur-
rence of Simon effects in Go/NoGo tasks. They show that the
response device itself may be critical in this kind of task: it can
induce participants to represent and code spatially an alternative
(non-requested) response, thus giving rise to the Simon effect (cf.,
Dittrich et al., 2012).
More interestingly, participants’ performance was critically
modulated by the kind of task executed after the baseline. Notably,
the instructions of the imaginative two-choice task and those of
the joint task gave rise to opposite effects. First of all, they had a
different impact on participants’ response speed. Regardless of the
response button used to respond, RTs slowed down in the imag-
inative two-choice task compared to the baseline task, whereas
the opposite trend was observed in the joint task. The significant
increase of RTs in the imaginative two-choice task is consistent
with previous findings showing that the mental simulation of an
action is functionally similar to its actual execution (e.g., Decety
et al., 1989; Decety and Grèzes, 2006). Thus, it is reasonable to
reckon that the imaginative two-choice task was similar to the
standard two-choice Simon task: in both cases the representa-
tion of two alternative and competitive responses slows down RTs
compared to tasks providing for only one possible response (i.e.,
standard Go/NoGo tasks; Donders, 1868/1969) 2. Conversely, in
2Another possible explanation of the slower RTs in the imaginative task com-
pared to the joint task is that the instructions of the imaginative task (just as
those of a standard two-choice Simon task) induced an extra workingmemory
the joint task a significant reduction of RTs was observed. That is
consistent with the findings of previous studies (e.g., Sebanz et al.,
2003) and is thought to be due to an increment of the arousal
induced by the mere presence of another person while perform-
ing the task (i.e., the so-called social facilitation effect; Guerin,
1993; Aiello and Douthitt, 2001). The social facilitation effect
observed here suggests that, although participants never met the
alleged partner, our social manipulation was effective in inducing
the belief of co-acting with another person.
More importantly for the purpose of this study, and contrar-
ily to the predictions of the action co-representation account, the
manipulations involved in the imaginative two-choice and joint
tasks had opposite influences on the occurrence of the Simon
effect.
In the imaginative two-choice task, the explicit request of
representing the alternative response induced participants either
to activate this representation (for left-button participants) or
to keep it active (for right-button participants). That made
the Simon effect emerge even when it had not occurred in
the baseline task. Left-button participants—who did not exhibit
any effect in the baseline task—showed a significant Simon
effect in the imaginative task, whereas right-button participants
continued to show the same (significant) effect shown in the
baseline task.
In contrast, in the joint task, the belief of co-acting with an
unseen co-actor was ineffective in eliciting the Simon effect; quite
the opposite, such a belief seems to have been effective in elimi-
nating the effect when it was present in the individual (baseline)
condition. Left-button participants continued to show no differ-
ence between the two correspondence conditions, whereas for
right-button participants the effect observed in the baseline task
disappeared.
The absence of the Simon effect in the joint task (irrespec-
tive of the button used by the co-actor) is conflicting with the
assumption—underlying the action co-representation account—
that sharing a Simon task with a co-actor, responsible for the
complementary target color, leads participants to activate the
representation of the response associated with this color (the co-
actor’s action). Based on this account, indeed, the mere belief of
co-acting with another individual, who responds to the comple-
mentary color with an alternative response, should give rise to the
Simon effect just like the explicit request to activate the represen-
tation of the alternative response. On the contrary, the absence of
any spatial correspondence effect in the joint task is in line with
the referential coding account of the joint Simon effect: it shows
that themere belief of co-acting with another person and themere
knowledge about the co-actor’s task are not sufficient to make
participants represent the alternative action. When the co-actor
is not physically present, the joint Simon effect does not show up.
load (participants had to keep in memory both complementary stimulus-
response mappings; e.g., red target–left button press and green target–right
button press), which makes this task more demanding. However, the occur-
rence in this task of a sizeable Simon effect, comparable to the standard effect
(see below in the main text), corroborates the hypothesis that two spatially
alternative responses were represented in a similar fashion to what happens in
standard two-choice tasks.
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Apart from the ineffectiveness of the joint task in inducing
the Simon effect, another aspect of our results deserves atten-
tion: the joint instructions made the Simon effect disappear for
the right-button participants who showed it in the baseline task.
This result is particularly interesting because, given that transfer
effects from one task to the other are very common (Ansorge and
Wühr, 2004, 2009; Lugli et al., 2013), one would have expected
to keep observing the Simon effect in this group of participants
when they performed the joint task.
The disappearance of the Simon effect cannot be traced back
to practice effects, as demonstrated by the results obtained in the
control condition. Indeed, right-button participants continued to
show the Simon effect in the repetition of the Go/NoGo task. It is
worth noting that these findings provide additional evidence of
the effectiveness of the social manipulation: if the social manip-
ulation had been ineffective in making participants believe that
another person was involved in the task, it should obviously have
had no effects on performance and, in the second (joint) task,
right-button participants of the social condition should have con-
tinued to show the Simon effect shown in the first (baseline) task,
as the participants of the control condition who simply repeated
the task individually.
The disappearance of the Simon effect can be accounted for
by assuming that in the joint task a division of labor between
the participant and the co-actor was established so as to allow
right-button participants to filter out the representation of the
alternative (left) response from their task representation. It is
plausible that, when performing the baseline task, right-button
participants associated the left response, which they had repre-
sented although it was not task-relevant, with the complementary
color. In the joint task, however, due to the belief that the actor
was responding to the complementary color, these participants
might have attributed this alternative response (as well as the
complementary color) to the co-actor. Given that these partici-
pants had no clue about the position of the co-actor, the response
associated with the co-actor might have lost its spatial conno-
tation. As a consequence, only one response remained active in
participants’ task representations and reference points for spa-
tial response coding were no longer available, which resulted
in the disappearance of the Simon effect. When only a non-
spatial response is represented, no overlaps between stimulus and
response dimensions (and nomatches/mismatches between stim-
ulus and response codes) occur that can produce the Simon effect
(Kornblum and Lee, 1995).
It is important to underline that such a division of labor seems
not to imply at all the representation of the co-actor’s response,
as indicated by the fact that the Simon effect shown by right-
button participants disappeared in the joint task irrespective of
whether they thought that the co-actor was responding with the
same mouse button as them or with the alternative one. It is sim-
ply the fact that the co-actor was in charge of the NoGo color that
seems to be critical in removing the response that was associated
with this color in participant’s task representation. This would
happen regardless of the response button used by the co-actor to
take care of such NoGo stimuli.
On the contrary, whether or not the participants know the
position of the co-actor might be relevant for the effectiveness of
the division of labor. Tsai et al. (2008) found a significant Simon
effect for participants who responded with the right mouse but-
ton in a task wherein the co-actor was not physically present and
was thought to be in charge of the NoGo color. Such an exper-
imental condition should lead to the division of labor between
the participant and the co-actor. Yet, in Tsai et al.’s study par-
ticipants were aware of the position of the co-actor’s room. In
contrast, no information about the co-actor’s position was pro-
vided here. As mentioned above, it is plausible that the division of
labor was effective in making the Simon effect disappear because
participants did not know the position of the person to which they
associated both the NoGo stimuli and the alternative response.
This might have been critical in letting the alternative response,
which was represented although not-required, lose its spatial con-
notation and its role as reference point for the spatial coding of the
required response.
If this were the case, then the Simon effect should persist both
when the co-actor is thought to respond to the same color as the
participant (i.e., when there is no division of labor) and when the
co-actor is supposed to work on the complementary color but
the participant knows where the co-actor is. These possibilities
were tested in Experiments 2 and 3, respectively.
EXPERIMENT 2
The disappearance of the Simon effect observed in the joint task
of Experiment 1 is ascribable to a division of labor between
the participant and the co-actor: knowing that another person
(the co-actor) was in charge of the complementary color, right-
button participants might be induced to attribute the alternative
response, which they had previously associated with this color,
to the co-actor. That would have allowed them to filter out the
alternative response from their task representation, as no spa-
tial information about the co-actor’s position was available. If
this were true, right-button participants should continue to show
the Simon effect in the joint task when task instructions ham-
per them from attributing the alternative response to the co-actor.
Experiment 2 aimed at testing this hypothesis. To this end, after
completing the baseline task, participants executed a joint task
identical to that of Experiment 1 except that they were told that
the co-actor, who was in a not-specified room, was responding
to their same Go color (e.g., both the participant and the co-
actor responded to the green color). The following predictions
could be made. First of all, we expected to replicate the pat-
tern of results observed in the baseline tasks of Experiment 1:
only right-button participants should show the Simon effect
in the individual Go/NoGo (baseline) task, whereas left-button
participants should not.
In the joint task, the Simon effect was not expected to occur
for left-button participants. Indeed, the joint Simon effect has
been proved not to occur even when the co-actor is present if
the co-actor is thought to respond to the same target color as the
participant (see Lam and Chua, 2010). In contrast, we expected
right-button participants to keep showing a Simon effect in the
joint task: given that the co-actor is thought to respond to the
same color as the participant, the alternative (left) response can-
not be attributed to anyone else and it should remain active in
participants’ task representation.
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METHODS
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate students of the University of Trento
(5 males; aged 19–27 years; all right-handed) participated in the
experiment.
Participants were not aware of the purpose of the experiment.
They did not participate in the previous experiment and had
normal or correct-to-normal vision.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were as in the social con-
dition of Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. After
the baseline task, participants performed a joint task in which
they believed that the co-actor was performing their same task
(i.e., s/he was responding to their same Go stimuli). The click
sound signaling the co-actor’s response was delivered at the
end of the Go trials, 800ms after the presentation of the Go
stimulus, thus avoiding possible overlaps with the participant’s
response. Participants were told that the click sound did not
correspond in time to the co-actor’s response and that it was
only meant to inform them whether the co-actor had responded
or not.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Error data (0.5%) were not analyzed. Correct mean RTs of left-
and right-button participants were submitted to two ANOVAs
with the same factors of the social condition of Experiment
1. Again, the co-actor’s response button (same- vs. alternative-
button) did not yield any significant effects.
The effect of task was significant for both left and right-button
participants (both Fs ≥ 7.02, both ps < 0.05, both η2p ≥ 0.33).
Consistent with the pattern of results observed in the social con-
dition of Experiment 1, RTs were faster in the joint than in the
baseline task (331 vs. 340ms and 321 vs. 340ms, for left- and
right-button participants, respectively).
The effect of correspondence was significant only for right-
button participants [F(1, 14) = 38.34, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.73]:
responses were faster in corresponding than non-corresponding
trials (324 vs. 337ms).
The Task × Correspondence interaction was significant for
neither group of participants (see Figure 3).
The results of Experiment 2 confirmed the predictions. Left-
button participants did not exhibit the Simon effect in either
the baseline or joint task. Conversely, right-button participants
showed a Simon effect in both tasks: corresponding trial advan-
tages of 12 and 14ms were observed in the baseline and joint
tasks, respectively.
Consistent with the results of Experiment 1, only right-button
participants showed the Simon effect in the baseline task. Most
importantly, the absence of any differences between the baseline
and joint tasks for both left- and right-button participants indi-
cates that when participants perform the joint task with a co-actor
who is thought to respond to their same Go color, the belief of
co-acting with another individual does not exert any influence
on their performance: participants behave as if they were still
performing the Go/NoGo task individually.
Results of Experiment 2 are consistent with the hypothe-
sis advanced to account for the disappearance of the Simon
effect in the joint task of Experiment 1 (i.e., the division of
labor hypothesis): as predicted on the basis of this hypothesis,
when right-button participants were prevented from attribut-
ing the alternative response to another person, they did show
a Simon effect in the joint task (as well as in the base-
line task). These findings suggest that the left mouse button,
which was automatically represented in the baseline task, was
still active in the task representation of right-button partic-
ipants during the execution of the joint task, as the color
associated with this button was not attributed to any other
person.
EXPERIMENT 3
In the joint task of Experiment 1, right-button participants (just
as left-button participants) were not told where the co-actor was.
The absence of any information about the position of the co-actor
might have caused the alternative response (the automatically
represented left button press) to lose its spatial connotation when
it was attributed to the co-actor. The aim of Experiment 3 was to
test this hypothesis. This experiment was also aimed at evaluating
the effect of the knowledge of the co-actor’s position on joint-
task performance of left-button participants, who did not seem
to have activated any alternative response representation in either
the baseline or joint task of Experiment 1.
FIGURE 3 | Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for right- and left-button
responding participants in Experiment 2. RTs are plotted as a function of
task (baseline vs. joint task) and spatial correspondence (corresponding vs.
non-corresponding trials), separately for the two response button positions
(right- vs. left-button participants). Asterisks indicate the presence of the
Simon effect.
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In Experiment 3, after completing the baseline task, partici-
pants performed a joint task identical to that of Experiment 1:
they were told that the co-actor was responding to the comple-
mentary color. However, unlike in Experiment 1, participants
were also informed that the co-actor was acting in a room that
was located on the opposite side relative to their response button
(e.g., if the participant had to respond by pressing the left button,
s/he was told that the co-actor was in the room on his/her right).
The position of the room in which the co-actor was supposed to
be always coincided with the position of the co-actor’s response
button (e.g., if the participant was told that the co-actor was act-
ing in the room on the left, s/he was also told that the co-actor was
responding with the left mouse button). This was meant to pre-
vent contrasting response spatial codes: as previously discussed,
there is evidence that spatial response coding can be based on dif-
ferent reference frames, and the Simon effect is proved to occur
only when one reference frame matches the other (Dittrich et al.,
2013).
The baseline task of Experiment 3 was identical to those
of the previous experiments. Therefore, consistently with both
Experiments 1 and 2, we expected right-button participants to
show a Simon effect in the baseline task. In contrast, no Simon
effect was expected for left-button participants.
Regarding to the joint task, different predictions could be
made for left- and right-button participants according to whether
the information about the co-actor’s position has an effect on spa-
tial response coding and depending on the type of effect. If this
piece of information is sufficient either to determine the repre-
sentation of the response that the co-actor is in charge of (i.e.,
the response alternative to the participant’s response) or to make
the co-actor him-/herself a reference point for spatial response
coding, left-button participants should show a joint Simon effect.
Conversely, if this information is not sufficient, no effect should
be observed for these participants: for them we should continue
to observe no differences between the two correspondence condi-
tions, as in Experiments 1 and 2, where no information about the
co-actor’s position was provided.
For right-button participants, we expected that the informa-
tion about the co-actor’s position allowed the alternative (left)
response (which is represented by virtue of practice factors)
to keep its spatial connotation even when it was attributed to
another person. If this were the case, the Simon effect shown by
these participant in the baseline task should persist in the joint
task.
METHODS
Participants
Sixteen undergraduate students of the University of Trento (all
females; aged 19–24 years; all right-handed) participated in the
experiment. They were not aware of the purpose of the experi-
ment, did not participate in either Experiment 1 or 2 and had
normal or correct-to-normal vision.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were as in the social condi-
tion of Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. Participants
were told that the co-actor was performing his/her part of the task
in the room spatially opposite to their response button position.
The co-actor was always thought to respond to the complemen-
tary color by pressing the alternative mouse button (e.g., if the
participant responded by pressing the right button, the co-actor
was thought to use the left one). As a consequence, the co-actor’s
response button position always coincided with the position of
the room in which s/he was supposed to act.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Error data (0.1%) were not analyzed. Correct mean RTs of left-
and right-button participants were submitted to two ANOVAs
with two within-subjects factors: task (baseline vs. critical task)
and correspondence (corresponding vs. non-corresponding).
The effect of task was significant for both left and right-button
participants (both Fs ≥ 6.95, both ps < 0.05, both η2ps ≥ 0.50):
RTs were faster in the joint than in the baseline task (312 vs.
351ms and 322 vs. 334ms, for left- and right-button participants,
respectively).
The effect of correspondence was significant only for right-
button participants, [F(1, 7) = 18.35, p < 0.005; η2p = 0.72]:
responses were faster in corresponding than non-corresponding
trials (322 vs. 334ms).
The Task × Correspondence interaction was significant for
neither group of participants (see Figure 4).
The results of the baseline tasks of Experiment 3 replicate those
observed in the baseline tasks of Experiments 1 and 2. The Simon
effect occurred in this task only for right-button participants.
Left-button participants did not show any effect.
In the joint task, left-button participants continued to show
no effect. That extends the results of the joint task of Experiment
1: besides confirming that the belief of co-acting with another
person—responsible for the complementary color—is not suf-
ficient to give rise to the Simon effect when the co-actor (i.e.,
the alternative action) in not physically present, it demonstrates
that the information about the co-actor’s position is ineffective as
well. Thus, even if both the co-actor’s location and the location
of his/her response device has been proved to be relevant for spa-
tial response coding when the co-actor sits next to the participant
(Dittrich et al., 2013), the off-line knowledge about either loca-
tion, when it is sustained by no perceptual evidence (cf., Ruys and
Aarts, 2010), is not able to induce the spatial coding of the par-
ticipant’s response 3. This is consistent with the idea that only a
3It has been proposed that another potential source of interference in joint
tasks is the conflict related to agent identification (i.e., determining whether
it is “my” or the other’s turn; Wenke et al., 2011). Participants in joint task
settings would represent that another person is responsible for the comple-
mentary task, and when the other person has to respond (i.e., the stimulus
conditions under which it is the co-actor’s turn). Participants would use all
available cues to distinguish between their own turn and the co-actor’s turn.
In joint Simon tasks, participants would use the stimulus position: the stimu-
lus position is seen as signaling the co-actor’s turn when it corresponds to the
co-actor’s position, thus slowing RTs in noncorresponding trials. On the basis
of the results of the present study we cannot rule out that this type of inter-
ference has a role in standard joint tasks, wherein the co-actor sits next to the
participant and the stimulus positions strictly coincides with the participant’s
and co-actor’s (absolute) positions. In this kind of task, the stimulus can be
seen as pointing to either the participant or the co-actor. However, the absence
of spatial effects for left-button participants in both Experiments 1 and 3 show
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FIGURE 4 | Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for right- and left-button
responding participants in Experiment 3. RTs are plotted as a function of
task (baseline vs. joint task) and spatial correspondence (corresponding vs.
non-corresponding trials), separately for the two response button positions
(right- vs. left-button participants). Asterisks indicate the presence of the
Simon effect.
salient, dynamic event, able to attract attention, may represent an
alternative action from which the participant’s response has to be
discriminated and thus can serve as a reference point for spatial
response coding (e.g., Dolk et al., 2013a).
Important for the purpose of this experiment, in contrast
to left-button participants, right-button participants showed a
reliable Simon effect, not only in the baseline task, but also in
the joint task. These findings are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that the disappearance of the Simon effect observed for
right-button participants in the joint task of Experiment 1 is
attributable to the fact that they did not have any information
about the co-actor’s position. Without this piece of information,
the assignment of the alternative response to the co-actor causes
this response to lose its spatial connotation. Indeed, when partic-
ipants know where the co-actor is, as happened in the joint task
of Experiment 3, the Simon effect persists, thus suggesting that
both the response associated with the complementary color and
the spatial code associated to it remain active in the participants’
task representation.
These findings indicate that even if the information about
the co-actor’s position is not sufficient to induce spatial response
coding, once participant’s response is spatially coded, such an
information may be effective inmaintaining the spatial coding of
the response, thus contrasting the effect of a possible division of
labor between the participant and the co-actor (cf., Vlainic et al.,
2010).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate the mecha-
nisms underlying the occurrence of the interference effect in joint
Simon tasks. To this end, in Experiment 1 participants performed
a Go/NoGo color task first individually (baseline), and then
either imaging themselves responding to the stimuli of the NoGo
that people do not use relative spatial correspondences as turn-taking signals:
neither the correspondence of the stimulus position with the position of the
co-actor’s response relative to the participant’s response nor the correspon-
dence of the stimulus position with the position of the co-actor’s room relative
to the participant’s room are used as an indication of the co-actor’s turn.
color (imaginative two-choice task) or co-acting with another
(unseen) person, who was in a not-specified room, and was
thought to respond to the NoGo stimuli (joint task). Following
the most prominent interpretations of the joint Simon effect,
different predictions could be made. According to the action co-
representation account (see Sebanz et al., 2005, 2006; Tsai et al.,
2008), knowing that the co-actor is responding to the comple-
mentary target stimuli is sufficient to activate the representation
of the response associated with these stimuli. It follows that when
the co-actor is thought to provide for the alternative response,
the spatial coding of the participant’s response and the conse-
quent Simon effect should occur independently of the co-actor’s
presence in the participant’s peripersonal space and regardless
of the lack of information about his/her position. In contrast,
according to the referential coding account (Dolk et al., 2011,
2013a), the knowledge about the co-actor’s task is not neces-
sary for the Simon effect to occur. The participant’s response is
assumed to be spatially coded because the co-actor constitutes a
salient spatially-connoted event occurring next to the participant.
As a consequence, no Simon effect should be observed when the
co-actor is not physically present and executes his/her part of the
task in a different room.
Participants’ performance in the imaginative and joint tasks
showed two different trends when compared with what was
observed in the baseline task and in a control condition wherein
participants continued to perform the Go/NoGo task individu-
ally. Instructions of the imaginative two-choice task made the
Simon effect occur, whereas those of the joint task were ineffective
in eliciting the Simon effect. Indeed, left-button participants, who
did not show any effect in the baseline task, continued to show no
effect in the joint task.
These findings are at odds with earlier results reported by
Tsai et al. (2008) and Ruys and Aarts (2010) and indicate that,
when possible confounding spatial factors are properly isolated
(or controlled), the belief of co-acting with another person who
is responding to the complementary color does not lead partici-
pants to represent an alternative response or, in some other way,
to code their own response spatially, which is supposed to be a
necessary condition for the joint Simon effect to occur. Thus, the
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present findings challenge the action co-representation account
(Sebanz et al., 2005, 2006): they show that the information about
the co-actor’s task is neither necessary nor sufficient to give rise to
the Simon effect.
The present results are more consistent with the referential
coding account of the joint Simon effect (Dolk et al., 2011, 2013a;
see also Guagnano et al., 2010 and Dittrich et al., 2012, 2013).
In the light of these results, it is reasonable to reckon that the
occurrence of the joint Simon effect in previous studies was due
to the fact the co-actor per se, when acting next to the participant,
represents a salient event, that is, an alternative action that par-
ticipants can use as a reference to code spatially their own action.
Consistently, we observed that when the co-actor is not physically
present, the participant’s response is not spatially coded in such a
way as to produce a spatial interference effect.
On the other hand, we observed that the information about
the co-actor’s task is not ineffective: it can have a specific
impact on participants’ task representation. In the social con-
dition of Experiment 1, indeed, the belief of co-acting with
another individual, who was responding to the complementary
color, made the Simon effect disappear for those participants
who had shown it in the previous (baseline) task. Note that
this finding, alongside with the social facilitation effect observed
in all three experiments (i.e., faster RTs in the joint than in
the baseline task), demonstrates the effectiveness of the social
manipulation involved in our joint task, thus ensuring us that
the experimental procedures used in this task make participants
believe they were really sharing the task with another person.
Most importantly, these findings can help us to understand the
actual effect that the mere belief of co-acting with another person
has on one’s own task representation. They complement previ-
ous research in showing that task sharing, under some circum-
stances, can reduce the interference effect produced by irrelevant
information compared to when people perform the task individ-
ually, rather than increase such an interference (cf., Heed et al.,
2010).
As previously discussed, the Simon effect shown in the base-
line task by right-button participants was probably due to the fact
that these participants represented the task-irrelevant (left) but-
ton because of the familiarity with the mouse and the greater
practice with this button. Task sharing caused the disappear-
ance of an interference effect produced by the (incidental) spatial
representation of an alternative response (the left response). To
account for this finding, we propose that, in the baseline task,
right-button participants associated the left response with the
complementary color. Afterwards, since in the joint task the com-
plementary color was up to the co-actor, participants attributed
the response associated with this color, as well as the color itself,
to the co-actor. Given that participants did not have any infor-
mation about the co-actor’s position, the response attributed
to the co-actor might have lost its spatial connotation, which
resulted in the disappearance of the Simon effect. In the base-
line task, the response of these participants was coded as on
the right because it was on the right with respect to the other,
non-requested but still represented, response. When this spa-
tial reference point was no longer available, no spatial response
coding, and thus no matches/mismatches between stimulus and
response codes occurred that could give rise to the Simon
effect.
This hypothesis is supported by the results of Experiments 2
and 3: the Simon effect shown by right-button participants in
the baseline task continued to occur in the joint task both when
the co-actor was thought to perform the same task as the par-
ticipant (i.e., the participant and the co-actor responded to the
same color; Experiment 2) and even if the co-actor was thought
to respond to the complementary color (as in Experiment 1) as
long as participants knew where the co-actor was (Experiment 3).
The persistence of the Simon effect in the joint task of Experiment
2 is consistent with the hypothesis that when the co-actor works
on the same stimuli as the participant, the alternative response
cannot be attributed to anyone else and, consequently, it remains
active in participants’ task representation and can keep serving as
a reference for spatial response coding. Conversely, the persistence
of the Simon effect in the joint task of Experiment 3 supports the
hypothesis that when the spatial information about the co-actor’s
position is provided, this kind of information allows the alterna-
tive response to keep its spatial connotation, even if attributed to
another person.
It is worth noting that, even when the position of a person
is known, the mere belief of co-acting with him/her does not
seem to induce spatial response coding so as to cause interference
effects, as indicated by the fact that left-button participants never
showed a Simon effect in the joint task, not even in Experiment
3. The knowledge about the co-actor’s position only had an effect
for right-button participants who had already (and irrespective
of this knowledge) represented two distinct spatial responses.
Indeed, spatial effects observed in the present study can only be
ascribed to the representation of the alternative response of the
participants themselves, because of either the familiarity with the
alternative button (in the right-button condition) or the explicit
request of the instructions (in the imaginative two-choice task).
Neither the position of the co-actor’s response, nor the position
of the co-actor himself/herself seems to have been represented or
used as a reference for spatial response coding. The knowledge
about the position of the co-actor only prevented the alterna-
tive response of the participant, which was represented by virtue
of other, non-social factors, from losing its spatial connotation.
Here, indeed, given that no perceivable feedback came from the
co-actor, who was not physically present and was thought to per-
form his/her task relatively far from the participant, the co-actor
and his/her response did not represent a salient, task-relevant
event fromwhich the participant response has to be discriminated
and cannot serve as reference for spatial coding (see Guagnano
et al., 2010; Dolk et al., 2011, 2013a).
Such considerations can help us in shedding light on the
results of previous studies that used paradigms similar to that
employed here. In the joint task of Tsai et al. (2008), a significant
Simon effect was observed. As previously underlined, participants
in this study responded with the right mouse button (i.e., Tsai
et al.’s task was comparable to our joint right-button task) but no
baseline data were collected, thus we cannot evaluate the actual
effect of the social manipulation: we do not know how large the
Simon effect would be in a (hypothetical) individual condition
and whether the social manipulation increases or decreases such
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an effect. Nevertheless, it is worth underlining another aspect
which may have contributed to the occurrence of the Simon effect
(or which have prevented its disappearance despite the division
of labor), that is, the fact that Tsai et al.’s participants knew the
position of the room in which the co-actor was acting, which
would render Tsai et al.’s task similar to the joint task of our
Experiment 3.
On the whole, the results of this study make a substantial con-
tribute to the comprehension of the mechanisms underlying the
joint Simon effect. They are consistent with the referential cod-
ing account in suggesting that social factors (the mere knowledge
of the co-actors’ task when the co-actor is thought to perform
the complementary task) are neither necessary nor sufficient for
the occurrence of the joint Simon effect (unlike what the action
co-representation account proposes). Furthermore, they demon-
strate that the information about the co-actor’s task can influence
participants’ performance both by speeding up participants’ RTs
and by causing the disappearance of the interference effect pro-
duced by the (incidental) spatial representation of an alternative
response.
Further studies are needed to understand better the mecha-
nisms underlying the disappearance of spatial interference effects
when participants share their task with other people. On the basis
of the available evidence, we can conclude that the participant–
co-actor division of labor is not effective in eliminating the Simon
effect when the co-actor’s position is known and, all the more
so, when the co-actor’s position is perceptually evident, as in the
standard joint Simon task, where the co-actor sits next to the par-
ticipant. In the latter case, indeed, the co-actor cannot serve as a
ploy to filter out the irrelevant alternative response, thus prevent-
ing the potentially interfering spatial response coding, but rather
is him/herself the reference point for the spatial coding of the
participant’s response.
However, many questions remain open about this issue. Since
the pivotal study of Sebanz et al. (2003), researchers have won-
dered “How social is the social Simon effect” (cf., Dolk et al.,
2011), which can be put into the question of whether the joint
Simon effect depends on the representation of the co-actor’s aims
and intentions. Although the joint Simon effect has been observed
even when the action alternative to the participant’s response is
provided by a non-human agent that works in a purely determin-
istic machine-like manner (i.e., a metronome; Dolk et al., 2013a),
there is evidence that, when the co-actor is an artificial agent (i.e.,
a robot or a puppet), the magnitude of the effect can be modu-
lated by the intentionality attributed to the co-actor (Müller et al.,
2011; Stenzel et al., 2012). These findings have been accounted
for by assuming that the degree of task co-representation may
vary and depends on how much the co-actor is perceived as func-
tioning in a human-like or biological inspired way (Stenzel et al.,
2012). However, they can also be accounted for by the referen-
tial coding account by assuming that the more similar the action
events referring to the participant and co-actor are, the more dif-
ficult the discrimination between them is, which, in turn, makes
their relative spatial coding more necessary (Dolk et al., 2013a).
As with the mechanisms underlying the occurrence of the
Simon effect in joint tasks, one may wonder how social is
the nature of the mechanisms underlying its disappearance in
task-sharing contexts. In the joint task of Experiment 1, right-
button participants showed to be able to filter out the response
associated with the NoGo stimuli irrespective of the specific
action executed by the co-actor to take care of these stimuli (i.e.,
the button pressed by the co-actor). This suggests that the co-
actor may simply provide participants with an effective strategy
to ignore the irrelevant stimuli and their associated response and
that the effectiveness of this strategy does not crucially rely on
the representation of what the co-actor specifically intends to do.
Nevertheless, further studies should be conducted in order to test
whether such a division-of-labor strategy depends on the co-actor
being perceived as an agent with intentional behaviors.
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